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EDITORIAL
Risks of general artificial intelligence
1. The conference
The papers in this special volume of the Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial
Intelligence are the outcome of a conference on the ‘Impacts and Risks of Artificial General
Intelligence’ (AGI-Impacts) that took place at the University of Oxford, St Anne’s College, on
10 and 11 December 2012 – jointly with the fifth annual conference on ‘Artificial General
Intelligence’ (AGI-12). The conference was organised by the Future of Humanity Institute at
Oxford: academically by Nick Bostrom and myself, with support from research fellows Stuart
Armstrong, Toby Ord, Anders Sandberg and more members of the program committee;
organisationally by Sea´n O´ hE´igeartaigh, with support from Alexandre Erler, Daniel Dewey,
Stuart Armstrong and others.
We are grateful to the Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) community for the openness to
these issues of security, as shown by the fact that they initiated this connection and that the vast
majority of the ca. 150 participants of the main AGI meeting also attended our AGI-Impacts
event. Last but not least, we want to thank the ‘European Network for Cognitive Systems,
Interaction and Robotics’ and the organisation ‘Saving Homo Sapiens’ for sponsoring the event.
2. The risks of general artificial intelligence
The notion of an agent with general intelligent ability is surely the original driving vision of
artificial intelligence (AI) research (see McCarthy, Minsky, Rochester, & Shannon, 1955) and
dominates much of its public image, but nearly all actual current work in AI is on specialised
technology, far removed from such a general ability – and often without use of the term AI.
Some researchers who wish to return to the original vision have formed the AGI community that
met at the sister conference in Oxford (http://agi-conference.org/2012). People in the AGI
community say that the original vision of human-level general intelligence was a fine one and
that time is ripe for this return to the roots because the extant approaches are in principle
sufficient to achieve it in the foreseeable future. (For a general research concept, see Adams
et al., 2012.)
There is no reason to think that the level of human intelligence is anything special in the
space of possibilities – it is easy to imagine natural or artificial intelligent agents that are vastly
superior to us. There also seem to be reasons to think that the development of AI is accelerating,
together with related technologies, and that the invention of intelligent machines itself would
further accelerate this development, thus constituting an ‘argument from acceleration’ for the
hypothesis that some disruptive transformation will occur (see Eden, Moor, Søraker, &
Steinhart, 2012, p. 2). One possibility is that ‘the first ultraintelligent machine is the last
invention that man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to
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keep it under control’ (Good, 1965, Section 2). If high-level AI occurs, this will have a
significant impact on humanity, especially on the ability of humans to control their fate on Earth.
This loss of control is a significant risk, perhaps an existential risk for humanity (for a survey, see
Sotala & Yampolskiy, 2013).
The discussion of risk is not dependent on the view that AGI is on a successful path
towards human-level AI – though it gains urgency if such ‘success’ is a non-negligible
possibility in the coming decades. It also gains urgency if the stakes are set high, even up
to human extinction. If the stakes are so high, even a fairly small possibility (say, 3%) is
entirely sufficient to motivate the research. Consider that if there were a 3% possibility that
a plane you are about to board will crash: that would be sufficient motivation for getting
off. The utility to be gained from scientific or philosophical research is usually quite a bit
lower.
As it happens, according to our recent research, the estimation of technical experts is that by
2050 the probability of high-level machine intelligence (that surpasses human ability in nearly
all respects) goes beyond the 50% mark, i.e. it becomes more probable than not (Mu¨ller &
Bostrom, in press) – on whether one can trust such estimations, see Armstrong, Sotala &
O´ hE´igeartaigh, this volume.
3. The papers
We called for papers with this description:
The conference explores questions such as: How can we best predict the impact of future intelligent
and superintelligent machines? How can we combine ideas from computer science, mathematics and
philosophy to best estimate this impact? What will be the impacts of AGI on the world? Which
directions of research should be most explored, and which should be de-emphasized or avoided?
What can we do to best ensure scientific rigour in this non-experimental academic field? What are
the best ideas and methods for ensuring both safety and predictability of advanced AI systems? Can
we lay the foundations to a field of rigorous study of realistic AGI control methods that lead to
implementable security protocols?
We had 39 submissions by the deadline, of which we accepted 11 (28%) after double-blind
review. The event also featured a keynote talk by Bruce Schneier and one by Steve Omohundro.
Of the 11 papers and 2 keynotes, 9 made a timely submission for this volume and survived a
further review by the editor, including a pass through automated plagiarism software (very
useful to catch sloppy referencing and self-plagiarism/recycling). It turned out that the ‘risks’
took precedence over the general ‘impacts’ in the submissions, and we thus dropped the term
‘impacts’ from the title of this volume.
Schneier presented the theory from his new book Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust that
Society Needs to Thrive (Schneier, 2012) that security needs to mature to a wider discipline,
which crucially relies on establishing and maintaining trust, a trust that is undermined by many,
including state agents. Margaret Boden, Nick Bostrom and Angelo Cangelosi spoke at the main
AGI conference. We have video interviews with Boden, Schneier and Aaron Sloman on the
conference site at http://www.winterintelligence.org/oxford2012/agi-impacts/videos/.
The paper by Omohundro (2014) introduces the problem of risk and the author presses his
point that even an innocuous artificial agent, like one programmed to win chess games, can very
easily turn into a serious threat for humans, e.g. if it starts acquiring resources to accomplish its
goals: ‘The seemingly harmless chess goal therefore motivates harmful activities like breaking
into computers and robbing banks’ (Section 4.2). He suggests that we need formal methods that
provide proofs of safe systems, a ‘Safe-AI Scaffolding Strategy’.
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The two following papers deal with prediction: Armstrong, Sotala & O´ hE´igeartaigh (2014)
propose a decomposition schema to compare predictions on the future of AI and then test five
famous predictions, from the Dartmouth Conference, Dreyfus, Searle, Kurzweil and
Omohundro – with the result that they are poor, especially the optimistic ones. T. Goertzel
(2014b) argues that while most progress in AI so far has been ‘narrow’ technical AI, the next
stage of development of AI, for at least the next decade and more likely for the next 25 years,
will be increasingly dependent on contributions from strong AI.
From here, we go into the proposals on how to achieve safer and ethical general AI. In the
fifth paper Brundage (2014) investigates the general limitations of the approach to supply an AI
with a ‘machine ethics’, and finds them both serious and deeply rooted in the nature of ethics
itself. Yampolskiy (2014) investigates which utility functions we might want to implement in
artificial agents and particularly how we might prevent them from finding simple but
counterproductive self-satisfaction solutions. B. Goertzel (2014a) explains how his ‘Goal-
Oriented Learning Meta-Architecture’ may be capable of preserving its initial – benevolent –
goals while learning and improving its general intelligence. Potapov and Rodinov (2014) outline
an approach to machine ethics in AIXI that is not based on ‘rewards’ (utility) but on learning
‘values’ from more ‘mature’ systems. AIXI is a Bayesian optimality concept for reinforcement
learning agents in unknown environments (see Hutter, 2005). Kornai (2014) argues that Alan
Gewirth’s dialectical argument, a version of classic Kantian ethical rationalism, shows how an
artificial agent with a certain level of rationality and autonomy will necessarily come to
understand what is moral.
Last but not least, Sandberg (2014) looks at the special case of general AI via whole brain
emulation, in particular, he considers the ethical status of such an emulation: would the
emulation (e.g. of a lab animal’s brain) have the ability to suffer, would it have rights?
4. The outlook
Perhaps it may be permitted to add two notes, from the perspective of the editor:
A note on terminology: It is characteristic that none of the authors in this volume uses the
term ‘singularity’ to characterise future development of AI – in fact, we had only a single paper
submission using this word in the title or subtitle. People prefer other, more specific terms like
‘intelligence explosion’, ‘AGI’, ‘superintelligence’, ‘acceleration’, etc. It would appear
‘singularity’ is now pretty much discredited in academic circles – with the notable exception of
Chalmers (2010) and the ensuing debate. The discussions about singularity are generally
characterised by conviction and fervour, which support amateurism and vitriolic exchanges –
even in academically respectable publications like the comments in Eden et al. (2012).
Singularity is associated with ideological techno-optimism, trans-humanism and predictions like
those of Ray Kurzweil (esp. Kurzweil, 2005; more recently Kurzweil, 2012) that ignore the deep
difficulties and risks of AI, e.g. by equating intelligence and computing power. What was the
‘Singularity Institute’ is now called the ‘Machine Intelligence Research Institute’ (MIRI).
‘Singularity’ is on its way towards becoming, literally, the trademark of a particular ideology,
without academic credentials.
A note on methodology: Of course, the problem of identifying the risks of general AI and
even controlling them before one knows what form or forms that general AI might take is rather
formidable. To make things worse, we don’t know when the move from fairly good AI to a
human and then superintelligent level might occur (if at all) and whether it will be slow enough
to prepare or perhaps quite rapid – it is often referred to as an ‘explosion’. As we have seen
above, one might try to mitigate the risks from a superintelligent goal-directed agent by making
Editorial 299
it ‘friendly’ (see e.g. Muehlhauser & Bostrom, 2014), by ‘controlling’ or ‘boxing’ it or just by
trusting that any superintelligent agent would be already ‘good’. All these approaches make
rather substantial assumptions about the nature of the problem, however; for instance, they
assume that superintelligence takes the form of an agentwith goals, rather like us. Of course, it is
conceivable that superintelligence will take very different forms, e.g. with no individuality or no
goals at all, perhaps because it lacks conscious experience, desires, intentional states or an
embodiment. Notoriously, classical critics of AI (Dreyfus, 1992; Searle, 1980) and more recent
cognitive science have provided arguments that indicate which directions AI is unlikely to take,
and full agency is among them (Clark, 2008; Haugeland, 1995; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2007; Varela,
Thompson, & Rosch, 1991). It is even doubtful that some assumptions about agency are
consistent: Can an agent have goals (rather than just a technical ‘utility function’) without
having the ability for pain and pleasure, i.e. phenomenal experience? If not, then an agent with
goals is also a moral patient and we have to treat it ethically.
Of course, superintelligence may constitute a risk without being an agent, but what do we
really know about it, then? Even if intelligence is not deeply mysterious and fundamentally
incomparable, as some people claim, it is surely not a simple property with a one-dimensional
metric. So, just saying that a general AI is, well, ‘intelligent’, does not tell us much: As
Yudkowsky urges, ‘One should resist the temptation to spread quantifiers over all possible
minds’ (2012, p. 186) – if that is true, the temptation to say anything about the even larger set of
‘possible intelligent systems’ is also to be resisted. There is a serious question whether rigorous
work is even possible at this point, given that we are speculating about the risks from something
about which we know very little. The current state of AI is not sufficiently specific to limit that
space of possibilities enough. To make matters worse, the object of our study may be more
intelligent than us, perhaps far more intelligent, which seems to imply (though this needs
clarification) that even if we were to know a lot about it, its ways must ultimately remain
unfathomable and uncontrollable to us mere humans.
Given these formidable obstacles our efforts are at danger to look more like theological
speculation than like science or analytic philosophy. We are walking a fine line and have to tread
very carefully. The papers in this volume are trying to make some headway in this difficult territory
since we remain convinced that cautious progress is better than nothing – and more work in this
direction will be available in Bostrom (in press) – but caution must remain our primary guide.
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